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The efficacy of commodity checkoff programs, especially
the effects of generic advertising programs, on producers’
welfare has received much attention by agricultural econo-
mists, commodity groups, and legal observers. At the cen-
ter of the debate has been the question of whether produc-
ers are better off under a voluntary or mandatory checkoff
program. Allocation of checkoff funds for generic advertis-
ing under a voluntary program often is characterized as a
free-rider problem because producers have an incentive
not to participate and free ride on those who choose to
contribute, thereby resulting in failure of the program to
produce enough funds to support advertising that benefits
all producers. Opponents of mandatory checkoff programs
generally have argued that such programs violate the prin-
ciple of economic freedom. Not surprisingly, adjudication
has, and continues to this day, to surround many of these
programs. While some proponents of checkoff programs
believe the argument for eliminating free-ridership is nec-
essary to mandatory programs, whether in fact individual
producers are better off under a mandatory program is still
an open question. 
There is much debate in the agricultural economics lit-
erature about the relative importance of generic advertis-
ing compared to other factors influencing demand for
commodities. Cross-commodity effects (the so-called
“spillover” effects) of generic promotion, for example, are
frequently ignored in analyses of the effectiveness of com-
modity promotion. These effects can be important
because increased beef promotion, for example, can reduce
poultry consumption; in turn, reduced poultry demand
can cause the demand for beef to decline, thus subtracting
from any direct effect of beef promotion on beef demand
(Brester & Schroeder, 1995). Piggott, Piggott, and Wright
(1995) derive the economic determinants of cross-com-
modity impacts and show specifically how returns in an
isolated market are dependent upon cross-commodity
effects. Other market characteristics also can determine
how generic advertising affects the demand for a commod-
ity. For example, Kinnucan et al. (1997) show that the
effects of generic advertising on meat demand are highly
sensitive to health effects. They conclude that if variables
accounting for health information about cholesterol and
other information about red meats are included in a
regression analysis to measure the demand effects of
generic advertising, the measured impact of the advertising
on meat consumption is smaller. Brester and Schroeder
(1995) find that accounting for brand advertising also
leads to smaller measured effects of generic advertising on
meat consumption. Whether or not the measured effects
of advertising are statistically significant also has not been
adequately addressed (Alston, Chalfant, & Piggott, 2000;
Davis, 2005). However, a review of the literature does
indicate generally high point estimates of the return to
generic advertising, ranging from 2:1 to 10:1 for each dol-
lar invested in advertising.
Even with generally high estimated rates of return to
advertising, a number of producer groups in recent years
have expressed dissatisfaction with checkoff programs and
have called for either new referendums or legal action to
eliminate mandatory programs (Becker, 2004). If rates of
return to commodity advertising are really so high, why do
we see dissatisfaction among producers about mandatory
checkoff programs? It may be that the published rates of
return to generic advertising are overstated because some
critical factors important for understanding how farmers’
returns are affected by generic advertising have been
neglected. 68 CHOICES 2nd Quarter 2006 • 21(2)
The Importance of Retail-to-
Farm Price Transmission
For the most part, research has not
focused on one very important aspect
of estimating the rates of return to
advertising - the retail-to-farm price
transmission. Usually aggregate dis-
appearance data are used to estimate
advertising elasticities and price elas-
ticities of demand which are then
used to calculate how much of a
change in retail price can be attrib-
uted to a one dollar increase in adver-
tising, holding the quantity of the
commodity produced fixed.  A criti-
cal assumption usually made in such
analyses (either implicitly or explic-
itly) is that that there is a one-to-one
transmission of changes in prices at
the retail level back to the farm level
so that returns in dollars at the retail
level measure the same return as at
the farm level.  An additional
assumption usually made is that pro-
ducers do not have enough time to
alter production decisions in
response to an advertising-induced
price increase so that supply can be
regarded as fixed. Certainly both of
these assumptions are questionable
and can have serious consequences
for the measuring the returns that
producers can expect to receive from
spending money on generic advertis-
ing.
Conceptually, whether or not the
farm-level response to retail-level
generic advertising is likely to be the
same as the retail-level response
depends primarily on the nature of
the retail-to-farm price transmission
occurring in those markets (Forker &
Ward, 1993, p. 55). There are at least
six reasons why the farm-level effects
of retail-level generic advertising may
differ from those that may occur at
the retail level:  (a) non-uniform
checkoff assessments; (b) non-zero
supply response of producers; (c)
input substitution between raw prod-
uct and marketing inputs; (d) gov-
ernment intervention; (e) market
power; and (f) the influence of con-
tracting and/or vertical integration.
The Nature of Checkoff Assessments
In part, the farm-level response to
generic advertising depends on how
the checkoff assessment is levied. If
the assessments are uniform across
producers, then the net farm-level
price effects resulting from advertis-
ing-induced demand shifts at the
retail level will be the same across
producers, assuming the commodity
produced is homogenous and pro-
ducers are price takers (Forker &
Ward, 1993). However, if the assess-
ments are not uniform or qualities of
the product differ across producers,
then per unit benefits will not neces-
sarily be equally distributed across
producers. Indeed, most commodi-
ties are produced where producers
receive either premiums or discounts
for their products. Thus, a constant
per unit assessment (e.g., $ per cwt
produced) can shift the distribution
of advertising gains from low-quality
to high-quality product suppliers, or
vice versa.
The Effect of Supply Response
The retail-to-farm price transmission
of advertising can be sensitive to the
length of time required for producers
to respond to higher farm prices
induced by additional generic adver-
tising. Most agricultural commodi-
t i e s  h a v e  d e m a n d  c u r v e s  t h a t  a r e
inelastic. The percentage change in
market price resulting from a one
percent increase in advertising is
equal to the advertising elasticity
divided by the sum of the supply
elasticity and the absolute value of
the elasticity of demand. If the abso-
lute value of the elasticity of demand
is 0.5 and the supply curve is upward
sloping with an elasticity of, say, 0.5
rather than perfectly inelastic as is
often assumed, then the percentage
increase in price from a one percent
increase in advertising would be half
what would have been calculated.
With a supply elasticity of 1, the per-
centage price increase would be cut
by a factor 3. Therefore, it is not hard
to see how a calculated rate of return
to generic advertising of, say, 2:1
could actually be 1:1, or even less if
the supply response to the advertis-
ing-induced price increase is taken
into account.
The preceding analysis assumes
that the checkoff assessment is a
lump sum tax. If the assessment is a
per unit fee, which is frequently the
case, then the effect of the supply
elasticity is mitigated to some extent
because a per unit assessment offsets,
at least partially, the direct effect of
increased industry output on output
price by shifting the tax onto con-
sumers. Indeed, Kinnucan and Myr-
land (2000) show that these two
effects just offset one another in the
single product case when determin-
ing the optimal checkoff rate. How-
ever, with multi-product industries,
the indirect and direct effects may
not be equal. Thus, the sensitivity of
the retail-to-farm price transmission
to the magnitude of the supply elas-
ticity depends on the nature of the
checkoff; that is, whether the assess-
ment is a lump sum or a per unit fee.
The Role of Input Substitution
Another potentially important
parameter affecting the retail-to-farm
price transmission of generic adver-
tising is input substitution between
the raw agricultural product and
marketing inputs in producing the
final composite food product. The
input substitution issue is important
first of all because a small degree of
substitutability can lead to a substan-2nd Quarter 2006 • 21(2) CHOICES 69
tial reduction in the retail-to-farm
transmission of advertising effects
(Wohlgenant, 1993).  Second, input
substitution has been found to be sig-
nificant and important for a wide
variety of agricultural commodities
(Wohlgenant, 1989). Often the
assumption is made that the final
retail product (beef, for example) is
produced using fixed proportions of
the raw material (cattle in this case)
and marketing inputs which may be
reasonable for an individual firm in
the short run. However, firms differ
in their “recipes” for producing prod-
ucts from raw materials. A higher rel-
ative raw material price will induce
firms with technologies using less of
the raw material to produce a larger
share of industry output, causing the
amount of the raw material per unit
industry output to decline. In addi-
tion, many final products we analyze
(like beef) are really composites of
disaggregated products (steaks,
roasts, ground beef), so that product
substitution may occur in response to
advertising even when there is no
substitution between the raw mate-
rial and marketing inputs in produc-
ing a single good (Wohlgenant,
1999). If no provision is made for the
possibility of such product substitu-
tion, but rather the product (beef) is
treated as a single composite good,
then what we observe as input substi-
tution may really be a combination
of substitution between the raw
product and marketing inputs and
changes in the composition of the
composite retail commodity pro-
duced (Wohlgenant, 1999). Higher
cattle prices, for example, induced by
increased generic advertising, lead the
marketing sector to produce higher-
value products; that is, products con-
taining less of the now relatively
more expensive raw product. For
some commodities like dairy, this
change in product composition may
be quite extensive because of the
wide variety of dissimilar commodi-
ties produced from milk (fluid milk,
cheeses, butter, yogurt, frozen dairy
products). The bottom line is that
because of the relatively inelastic sup-
ply of the agricultural raw material,
an increase in demand for the end
product induced by generic advertis-
ing increases the relative price of the
agricultural raw material and induces
substitution away from the raw mate-
rial toward marketing inputs so that
the net effect on farm price may be
less than would be the case if there
was one-to-one transmission of retail
demand increases to the farm level.
To demonstrate the importance
of input substitution, I have calcu-
lated the retail-to-farm price trans-
mission coefficients for beef, pork,
poultry, and dairy presented in Table
1. These coefficients are calculated by
dividing retail own-price elasticities
by own-price elasticities of derived
demand for the same commodities,
and then multiplying these numbers
by average values of the farmer’s share
of the retail dollar as demonstrated in
Wohlgenant (1993). If the coeffi-
cients were to equal 1, there would be
a one-to-one transmission of the
price effects of generic advertising
from the respective retail markets
down to the farm level. However,
because the coefficients are actually
all less than 1 for all these commodi-
ties, a one cent increase in retail price
translates into less than a one cent
increase in farm price, holding the
supply of the farm product fixed. In
the case of beef, for example, a one
cent increase in retail price from
advertising translates into a 0.67 cent
increase in the farm price. The very
small transmission elasticity of dairy,
0.16, suggests that factors other than
input substitution may be at work. 
Why don’t more studies of
generic advertising make the distinc-
tion between retail and farm level
effects if transmission effects are so
m u c h  d i f f e r e n t  t h a n  o n e ?  T h e
answer, in part, is that many analysts
fail to appreciate the limitations of
the disappearance data published by
the USDA. These data, while derived
very carefully and useful for many
purposes, are best viewed (as the
name implies) as production data
rather than as consumption data.
The apparent consumption data are
derived as production plus adjust-
ments made for net exports and
changes in inventories. The resulting
numbers are multiplied by fixed
input-output coefficients, reflecting
loss in processing, to arrive at figures
to estimate the amount of the raw
material “disappearing” into the mar-
keting channel that ultimately is con-
sumed. The main problem with
using these numbers to represent
consumption is that one has to
assume that, for example, a pound of
hamburger is valued the same as a
pound of steak to the consumer
which obviously is not the case. A
preferable estimate of consumption
would be a constant dollar measure
where each component of the com-
posite quantity is weighted by a fixed
price (Nelson, 1991). The error in
using simple sum quantities of meat
can be quite large (Brester and Wohl-
genant, 1993). Researchers using dis-
appearance data may come closer to
Table 1. Estimates of retail-to-farm 
transmission of generic advertising for 
beef, pork, poultry, and dairy.
Commodity
Increase in farm price from 






Note: Estimates assume fixed supply and are cal-
culated from Wohlgenant (1989).70 CHOICES 2nd Quarter 2006 • 21(2)
estimating the true elasticities by
specifying and estimating wholesale
level or farm level demand functions,
rather than consumer demand func-
tions. 
The Effect of Government Intervention
Government intervention in com-
modity markets can also affect the
retail-to-farm price transmission of
advertising. The dairy industry is a
case in point where the dairy price
support program occurs in wholesale
markets, causing derived demand for
milk at the farm level to follow one
regime if the price is set by the
wholesale market for manufactured
goods or another regime if the price
is set by the support prices for cheese
and/or butter. The effect of govern-
ment intervention in dairy markets is
to cause derived demand overall to be
more elastic (Wohlgenant & Clary,
1993). On average, we would expect
the retail-to-farm price transmission
from advertising to be reduced as a
result of government intervention.
Therefore, the small coefficient
observed empirically (Table 1) may
be explained in large part by govern-
ment intervention in dairy markets.
Another example might be cotton
(Murray et al., 2001) where the inter-
action of agricultural policy, interna-
tional trade, and markets has led to
situations during some time periods
in which the farm price has been
unaffected by demand shifts, includ-
ing any increases from generic adver-
tising.
The Presence of Market Power
The presence of market power in the
processing/marketing sector can
affect retail-to-farm price transmis-
sion of advertising. If there is a wedge
between price and marginal cost
caused by market power and this
wedge (which would be positive and
larger than 1) is constant, then mar-
ket power acts much like the effect of
input substitution. The overall effect
in this case is to cause the derived
demand elasticity for the agricultural
raw material to be larger in absolute
value (Wohlgenant and Piggott,
2003). Therefore, the effect of mar-
ket power in this case would be to
lessen the retail-to-farm price trans-
mission of advertising. An important
question is how significant does mar-
ket power have to be to have an eco-
nomically important effect on retail-
to-farm price transmission? A simula-
tion analysis conducted by Wohl-
genant and Piggott suggests that mar-
ket power is not as important in the
retail-to-farm price transmission of
advertising as other more fundamen-
tal market determinants. In particu-
lar, they show that the impact of
advertising on retail-to-farm price
transmission assuming some level of
market power is indistinguishable
from that obtained assuming price-
taking behavior. In fact, the simula-
tion results show that the results are
most significantly affected by supply
response and input substitutability
between the raw product and mar-
keting inputs. Kinnucan, extending
the analysis to market power in both
the output and agricultural raw
material markets, arrives at a similar
finding that optimal advertising
intensity is extremely sensitive to
input substitution but not to market
power.
The Industrialization of Agriculture
In recent decades, the agricultural
processing and marketing sectors
have undergone unprecedented orga-
nizational and structural changes.
Increased vertical coordination
through contracting and increased
vertical integration upstream into
agricultural production have been
pervasive in livestock and fruit and
vegetable industries and may affect
the retail-to-farm price transmission
of advertising. In particular, increased
contracting and ownership of live-
stock by processors (so-called “cap-
tive supplies”) allegedly has created
market power for livestock processors
in procurement of animals from the
spot market. If true, then the trans-
mission of generic advertising to pro-
ducers may have been affected,
although how and in what way are
questions that have not been
addressed.
One way in which the transmis-
sion of advertising may have been
affected by the industrialization of
agriculture is through its distribu-
tional effects on producers. Vertical
integration and contracting are char-
acterized by much more quality dif-
ferentiation than one might find on
the spot market (Goodhue and
Rausser, 2003). Moreover, some
companies are not only integrating
upstream into production but down-
stream into retail outlets with
branded products so that generic
advertising in some instances may
work against these firms. Thus,
movement toward branded products
and increased vertical integration
downstream may lead to less support
for commodity checkoff programs
that fund generic advertising.
Conclusions
The evaluation of the economic
effects of generic advertising on
prices and producer welfare is an area
of research that has occupied a lot of
attention. Despite the amount of
econometric research indicating high
rates of return to generic advertising,
there is disenchantment and disbe-
lief among some producers and com-
modity groups as to whether produc-
ers actually benefit from generic
advertising. More accurate measure-
ment of the farm-level effects of2nd Quarter 2006 • 21(2) CHOICES 71
retail-level generic advertising must
account for various factors that influ-
ence the transmission of retail
demand changes from advertising to
the farm level. Six of the potentially
most important of these factors are:
(1) non-uniform assessment of the
checkoff program, (2) non-zero sup-
ply response of producers, (3) input
substitution between raw product
and marketing inputs, (4) govern-
ment intervention, (5) market power,
and (6) influence of contracting and/
or vertical integration. Which of
these different factors is most impor-
tant cannot be determined conclu-
sively because the answer depends
upon the particular commodity
under investigation. However,
research to date suggests that input
substitution, government interven-
tion, and contracting and vertical
organization are generally the factors
with potentially the most important
effects on the transmission of the
retail-levels effects of advertising
down to the farm level. The impor-
tance of input substitution in esti-
mating returns to advertising suggests
that an understanding of the nature
of the production process for con-
verting raw food materials into the
myriad of final consumer products is
essential to understanding how
generic advertising is transmitted
from retail markets back to the farm
l e v e l .   F u t u r e  r e s e a r c h  w i l l  n e e d  t o
focus on the issues related to retail-
to-farm price transmission if more
accurate measures of the return to
producers from generic advertising
are to be developed.
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